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Labor LaW-INTERNATIONAL UNIONS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR WILD-
CAT STRIKES UNAUTHORIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL AND INITIATED
BY UNION MEMBERS IN VIOLATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS TO WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL IS A PARTY-Carbon
Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
The United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), which nego-
tiates collective bargaining agreements in the coal producing in-
dustry, is a three-tiered organization consisting of local unions, dis-
trict unions, and the international.' The district and the local
unions manage the day-to-day affairs of union members and fulfill
the duty of resolving grievances which arise in the context of col-
lective bargaining relationships.2 The international relies upon the
district union to inform its members that "wildcat" strikes are un-
lawful and detrimental to the union, the company, and the public.
The Carbon Fuel Company (Carbon Fuel), a West Virginia coal
company, operates approximately 15 mines in West Virginia. Be-
tween 1969 and 1973, Carbon Fuel's mines were the site of forty-
eight "wildcat" strikes initiated by members of three of the
UMWA's local unions. The strikes violated the 1968 and 1971
National Bituminous Wage Coal Agreements to which Carbon Fuel
and the UMWA were parties. The forty-eight work stoppages at
Carbon Fuel's mines were not authorized, condoned or in any way
supported by the international.4 The trial court record revealed
that District 17, a regional subdivision of the UMWA which
represented employees at Carbon Fuel's mines, was able to halt a
majority of the strikes within two to four days after their
commencement.
5
Relying on section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), as amended, commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act,6
1. For a description of the union's structure and function, see Hodgson v. UMWA, 344
F. Supp. 17, 20-21 (D.D.C. 1972).
2. Brief for Respondents at 3-4, Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
3. Wildcat strikes are generally characterized as work stoppages, organized by a minority
of union members whose activity is not authorized by the union.
4. Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212, 213 (1979).
5. Brief for Respondents at 4-5, Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). That section, in pertinent part, provides:
§ 185. Suits by and against labor organizations
(a) Venue, amount, and citizenship
Suits for violation of contract between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chap-
ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) Responsibility for acts of agent; entity for purpose of suit; enforcement of
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Carbon Fuel filed a breach of contract action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, seeking
injunctive relief and damages. The UMWA, District 17, and three
local unions were named as defendants.7 Carbon Fuel contended
that the "wildcat" strikes breached the 1968 and 1971 collective
bargaining agreements.8 The district court determined as a matter
of law that the strikes did violate those agreements, and therefore
instructed the jury that the UMWA and District 17 could be found
liable for damages if it determined from a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendants did not use all reasonable means to
prevent and terminate the work stoppages or strikes undertaken in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement.' Jury verdicts
were returned against all five defendants. Each defendant appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.10
Consistent with its earlier decision in United Construction Work-
ers v. Haislip Baking Co.,'" the Fourth Circuit vacated only the
judgments against the UMWA and District 17, and remanded the
case to the district court with directions to dismiss those claims.1 2
The Fourth Circuit noted's that its holding was in accord with the
weight of authority, yet at variance with the Third Circuit decision
in Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Team-
money judgments
Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect com-
merce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such
labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees
whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment
against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be en-
forceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and
shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
(e) Determination of question of agency
For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting as
an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his
acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized
or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (a), (b), (e) (1976).
7. Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212, 213 (1979).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 215.
11. 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955).
12. Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 582 F.2d 1346, 1351 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
The court also vacated in part the judgments against the local unions, none of which sought
review by the Supreme Court. Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212, 215 n.3 (1979).
13. 582 F.2d 1346, 1350 (4th Cir.), afld, 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
CASE NOTES
sters."
To resolve the conflict created by the Haislip and Eazor deci-
sions, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Car-
bon Fuel Co. v. UMWA' 5 and unanimously affirmed the Fourth
Circuit's judgment. The Court held that, under section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act, the provisions of the collective bargaining agree-
ments did not impose liability upon the UMWA and District 17 for
their failure to use all reasonable means to prevent or halt "wild-
cat" strikes engaged in by subordinate local unions.16
The initial question discussed by the Court was whether section
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act mandated the finding that the inclu-
sion of an arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agree-
ments imposed upon the international an implied obligation to use
all reasonable means to halt the unauthorized strikes of its affili-
ated local unions. 17 The Supreme Court's analysis of the issue is
premised on an examination of the history and congressional de-
sign underlying sections 301(a), (b) and (e). l8
Following its long-standing construction of section 301(a), the
Court confirmed the enforceability of the collective bargaining
agreement under that section of the act.1 9 In its discussion of the
congressional intent subtending sections 301(b) and (e), the Court
emphasized that Congress intentionally refrained from imposing li-
ability upon a union for strikes that are not authorized, ratified, or
supported by the union.20 Congress enacted section 301(b) as a re-
placement for the virtually unrestricted enunciation of agency
standards embodied in the 1935 version of the NLRA." Section
2(2) of the 1935 act treated the term "employer" as the singular
14. 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975). See generally 84 HARV. L. REv. 601 (1976), for a discus-
sion of Eazor Express.
15. 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
16. Id. at 221-22. See also NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Warehousemen's
Union, 283 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1960). In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the interna-
tional was not liable for the acts of its local union. The opinion, however, provides examples
of actual instances where international unions were held liable for the activities of their
local unions. Id. at 563-67.
17. 444 U.S. at 216.
18. Id. at 216-17. See note 6 supra.
19. 444 U.S. at 216. The principle that § 301(a) renders collective bargaining agreements
judicially enforceable against labor unions was forged in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957), which involved a suit brought by the union under § 301 to enforce an
arbitration clause in accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The
Supreme Court held that § 301(a) provides the federal courts with the authority to enforce
collective bargaining agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations. Id. at 450-51.
20. 444 U.S. at 216.
21. Id. at 217.
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basis for determining liability and defined the term as "anyone
acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly.
2 2
Section 301(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, however, utilizes a more
refined agency standard for determining liability. It is an adapta-
tion of the common law doctrine of respondeat superior and pro-
vides that any labor organization which represents employees in an
industry affecting commerce shall be bound by the acts of its
agents.28 Section 301(e) compliments section 301(b) by requiring
that the determination of whether a person is acting as an agent of
another will be controlled by the standard set forth in section
301(b), regardless of whether the person's acts were authorized.24
Section 301(e), therefore, was designed to underscore the applica-
bility of the general law of agency.
The Court emphasized that Congress's utilization of a common
law agency test was not unheralded. Rather, the legislative applica-
tion of the principle simply mirrored the position forged in
Coronado Coal Co. v. UMWA.2 5 Coronado involved a suit for dam-
ages suffered by the Coronado Coal Company as a result of an al-
leged conspiracy by a local union to restrain and prevent
Coronado's interstate coal trade, in violation of sections one and
two of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.2' The Court held that the evi-
dence failed to reveal that the UMWA had initiated, participated
in, or ratified any interference with the company's coal trade.27
Justice Taft, writing for the majority, stated that an international
union may be held liable for the illegal acts of its local unions only
if it is established that the violative acts were committed by
"agents of the international union in accordance with their funda-
mental agreement of association."' 8
22. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2(a), 1935 Stat. 450 (1935).
23. 444 U.S. at 217. Congress chose the common law doctrine of respondeat superior
rather than the more limited measure of liability imposed -by § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). That section requires "clear proof of actual participation in, of
actual authorization of such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge
thereof." Id. For a discussion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act standard for determining the
liability of a union, see UMWA v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 735-42 (1966). See, e.g., Riverside
Coal Co. v. UMWA, 410 F.2d 267 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 8A (1957).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1976). See note 6 supra. "Person" is defined as "one or more
individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees
in bankruptcy, or receivers." 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1976).
25. 268 U.S. 295 (1975).
26. Id. at 296.
27. Id. at 304.
28. Id. In UMWA v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954), it is suggested that the
Coronado standard is not that of ordinary agency. Any question, however, which may have
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Accordingly, the Court in Carbon Fuel recognized that in order
to effectuate section 301(a), congressional purpose dictated that
sections 301(b) and (e) be concurrently implemented. In its rejec-
tion of Carbon Fuel's argument, the Court reasoned that a duty to
use all reasonable efforts to end a "wildcat" strike should not be
imposed upon an international unless such a duty is firmly
grounded in the bargained for terms of the contract. A determina-
tion that the mere presence of an arbitration clause in a collective
bargaining agreement creates a correlative duty to control conduct
by a subordinate body would have conflicted with Congress's in-
tent to subject unions to responsibility only in accordance with the
common law rules of agency prescribed in sections 301(b) and (e).29
The second issue discussed in Carbon Fuel was whether the lan-
guage of the collective bargaining agreement imposed liability
upon the UMWA for its failure to halt the unauthorized actions of
its local unions.8 0 Carbon Fuel argued that the contract's provision
which required the UMWA "to maintain the integrity of the con-
tract," bound the international to an implied obligation to use all
reasonable means to end unauthorized strikes.31
In approaching this question, the Court began with an examina-
tion of the policy concerns reflected in the Taft-Hartley Act. It was
recognized that fundamental to the application of the act is the
policy of free collective bargaining.8 2 Congress' desire to achieve a
free bargaining climate is reflected in section 8(d) of the NLRA,
which defines "collective bargaining" as "not [to] compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of concession."I
The spirit of this legislation is further embodied in H.K. Porter Co.
v. NLRB," in which the Supreme Court stated that "allowing the
Board to compel agreement when the parties themselves are un-
able to agree would violate the fundamental premise on which the
Act is based-private bargaining under governmental supervision
of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the
been raised in Patton regarding Coronado's standard of agency has been settled by the Car-
bon Fuel decision.
29. 444 U.S. at 217.
30. Id.
31. Id. The substance of the "integrity" clause was not discussed by the Court because
the content of the clause did not support Carbon Fuel's cause of action. Id. at 216 n.5.
32. Id. at 218.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
34. 397 U.S. 99 (1970). Accord, Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive
Bd., Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, 417 U.S. 249 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l
Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287 (1972).
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actual terms of the contract." 5
The Court in Carbon Fuel continued the analysis by recognizing
that the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement
establish the tenor of the parties' relationship. In United Steel-
workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.," which in-
volved an action by the union to compel the employer to enter ar-
bitration, the Supreme Court stated that arbitration is a matter of
contract, hence a party cannot be forced to enter arbitration in any
dispute to which he has not agreed to arbitrate. Parties to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement are bound to the terms of their contract
and courts may not impose or °create provisions which vary from
the bargain struck by the parties.8
The Court then turned to an examination of the contractual pro-
vision upon which Carbon Fuel based its argument. The bargaining
history of the 1968 and 1971 contracts disclosed that Carbon Fuel
and the UMWA initially entered a collective bargaining agreement
in 1941. The terms of the 1941 agreement contained a no-strike
provision which expressly rendered the UMWA liable for breach of
contract. The 1941 agreement was ultimately modified by the dele-
tion of the no-strike clause and the language did not appear in the
1947 collective bargaining agreement. Instead, the parties decided
that all grievances would be settled through arbitration or collec-
tive bargaining, and that the coverage of the contract was re-
stricted to employees "able and willing to work."3 8 A third contract
was entered into in 1950, and the "able and willing to work" lan-
guage was removed and replaced by the parties' commitment "to
maintain the integrity of this contract and to exercise their best
efforts through available disciplinary measures to prevent stop-
pages of work by strike or lockout pending adjustment or adjudica-
tion of disputes and grievances in the manner provided in this
Agreement." 9 In 1952 the parties resumed negotiations. The
UMWA, aware that the "best effort" provision subjected it to criti-
cism or liability for its failure to discipline locals or members who
engaged in unauthorized work stoppages, negotiated the deletion
35. 397 U.S. at 108.
36. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
37. 444 U.S. at 219. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., Hotel
& Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, 417 U.S. 249, 254-55 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l
Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287 (1972); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 104-06
(1970); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960); United Steelwork-
ers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 576 (1960).
38. 444 U.S. at 219.
39. Id. at n.7.
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of this language. In its stead, the 1952 contract contained the fol-
lowing provision:
The United Mine Workers of America and the Operators agree
and affirm that they will maintain the integrity of this contract
and that all disputes and claims which are not settled by agree-
ment shall be settled by the machinery provided in the "Settle-
ment of Local and District Disputes" section of the Agreement
unless national in character in which event the parties shall settle
such disputes by free collective bargaining as heretofore practiced
in the industry, it being the purpose of this provision to provide
for the settlement of all such disputes and claims through the ma-
chinery in this contract provided and by collective bargaining
without recourse to the courts. 40
The 1952 provision survived through the years and was incorpo-
rated in the 1968 and 1971 contracts. 41 Accordingly, in the Court's
appraisal of the "integrity" clause it was reasoned that the parties
did not intend the deleted language of the contracts preceding
1952 to be subsumed in the 1968 and 1971 contracts. The Court
determined that in light of its bargaining history, the "integrity"
clause was not designed to function as an imposition of liability
upon the UMWA for its failure to discipline or halt unauthorized
strikes. It was recognized that judicial intervention in the form of a
judicially enforceable obligation imposed upon the UMWA for its
failure to act would be contrary to and violative of the free collec-
tive bargaining process.'
Similar interpretations of such bargaining history had been ex-
pressed in Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp.4' and in United Construc-
tion Workers v. Haislip Baking Co. The court reasoned that the
Lewis and Haislip interpretations, which preceded the 1968 and
1971 contracts, provided Carbon Fuel with adequate notice of the
courts' treatment of the "integrity" language. Hence, Carbon
Fuel's failure to convey its desired interpretation during the con-
tract negotiations functioned as tacit acceptance of the Lewis and
Haislip understandings.4'
The Carbon Fuel decision is significant because it imparts a
40. Id. at 221-22 (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 259 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'd by an equally divided court, 361 U.S. 459, 464
(1960).
44. 444 U.S. at 221-22.
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clear definition to sections 301(b) and (e), and establishes that the
bargaining history associated with a collective bargaining agree-
ment will determine the role of an "integrity" clause. The Carbon
Fuel holding finally resolved a moderately vexatious question
which the Court left undisturbed in 1955 when it denied the writ
of certiorari in Haislip.4' In order to achieve a comprehensive per-
spective of the Carbon Fuel decision it is necessary to examine the
factors which prompted the Court to discuss in 1979 that which it
had refused to entertain in 1955.
In Haislip, the Haislip Baking Company sued the United Con-
struction Workers and the UMWA under section 301 for damages
resulting from a "wildcat" strike staged by union members in re-
sponse to the discharge of two employees for unexcused absences.'
Efforts by the regional director of the United Construction Work-
ers and its field representative to reinstate the employees failed,
and the strike continued, causing the financial collapse of the
Haislip Baking Company.'1
The Fourth Circuit recognized that even in the absence of an
express no-strike clause, the basic purpose of the collective bar-
gaining agreement was to resolve grievances in a cooperative fash-
ion. Hence, the "wildcat" strike, which was employed as a primary
method of recourse, violated the collective bargaining agreement.
The court stated, however, that the internationals could not be
held liable for the strike in breach of the collective bargaining
agreement, unless the internationals' agents participated in, rati-
fied, or encouraged continuance of the strike.'5
The court concluded that the activity of the field representative
and the regional director was not a manifestation of the interna-
tionals' involvement." It was determined that the grievance in-
volved only a local concern unrelated to the interests of the in-
ternationals and that the field officer and the regional director
lacked the authority to adopt, participate in, or encourage the
"wildcat" strike.5" Accordingly, the court ruled that the interna-
tionals were absolved of any liability because the Haislip Baking
Company had failed to prove the existence of an agency relation-
ship between the internationals and the local unions which were
45. 350 U.S. 847 (1955).
46. 223 F.2d at 876, 879.
47. Id. at 874.
48. Id. at 874-75.
49. Id. at 878.
50. Id.
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engaged in the unauthorized activity. The judgments against the
UCW and the UMWA were reversed."
The Haislip decision was reached in the context of scant case
law. The holding represented one of the primary judicial interpre-
tations of sections 301(b) and (e), and it established that Congress
intended an international union to suffer imputed liability only
when the local union acts as an agent of the international. The
rationale of this decision has been shared by several courts of
appeals.52
In 1956 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
in Garmeada Coal Co. v. UMWA, 53 expressly relied upon the Hais-
lip decision as the judicial basis for its decision. Garmeada Coal
involved a breach of contract action initiated by Garmeada Coal
Company against the international for illegal strikes conducted by
members of the international's local union. The court determined
that, in the absence of an agency relationship, the international
was not liable for the illegal activity of its affiliated union. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed the holding of the district court, and re-
lieved the international of liability for the illegal activity of its
members."
More recently, in Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. UMWA," the Sixth
Circuit reiterated its commitment to the principles of agency em-
bodied in sections 301(b) and (e). In Southern Ohio, the court de-
clined to apply agency principles which would have held the inter-
national liable for the mass action of its members.56 Instead, the
court followed the more popular view that an international union
will be held responsible only for the authorized or ratified actions
of its agents. 57 For reasons unrelated to the agency question the
51. Id. at 879.
52. See United States Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 526 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1976); United States
Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976);
North American Coal Corp. v. Local 2262, UMWA, 497 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1974); Old Ben
Coal Corp. v. Local 1487, UMWA, 457 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1972); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v.
UMWA, 436 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 930 (1971); W. L. Mead, Inc. v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 126 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass. 1954), afl'd, 230 F.2d 576 (1st
Cir. 1956), cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956).
53. 230 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1956).
54. Id. at 945.
55. 551 F.2d 695 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
56. Id. at 701. The "mass action" theory of liability is based on the belief that large
groups of employees do not act collectively without leadership and that a functioning union
must be held liable for the mass action of its members. Eazor, 520 F.2d at 963.
57. 551 F.2d at 701. See, e.g., North American Coal Corp. v. Local 2262, UMWA, 497
F.2d 459, 466-67 (6th Cir. 1974). The Sixth Circuit has recognized that an international
union's orchestrated passivity towards unauthorized strikes may, at times, qualify as sufli-
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court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the
case for further consideration by the trial court. 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued
a decision following the decisions of the Sixth Circuit. In United
States Steel Corp. v. UMWA,"9 the Fifth Circuit prophetically ex-
pressed the position, subsequently approved by the Supreme Court
in Carbon Fuel, that an international union should suffer imputed
liability only when it is demonstrated that the international in-
volved itself in the illegal activity of its affiliated local union. The
Fifth Circuit stated that a parent union is exempt from responsi-
bility for the illegal acts of its local unions in the absence of com-
plicity or ratification of the challenged behavior.60
In 1975 the decision of Eazor Express, Inc. v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters placed the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit in direct conflict with the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Circuits and created the disparity in the law which
prompted the Supreme Court to grant Carbon Fuel's petition for
writ of certiorari. 1 Eazor involved a suit brought by Eazor Ex-
press, Inc. (Eazor), commenced under section 301, to recover dam-
ages for alleged unauthorized strikes. Daniel Motor Freight, Inc.
(Daniel) and its parent company, Eazor, were trucking firms whose
employees were members of the Teamsters. On August 17, 1968,
Daniel dismissed two members of Local 377 for having refused to
fulfill a work assignment. After fruitless efforts to resolve their
grievances, the discharged employees began to picket Eazor's ter-
minal, and were quickly joined by fellow members of the local. A
"wildcat" strike developed and ultimately spread to a second union
which was under contract with Eazor.'2
The Third Circuit held that the strike violated the collective
bargaining agreement, and that implied in the no-strike clause of
the agreement was an obligation on the part of the international,
as a party to the contract, to use every reasonable means to halt
cient inducement and encouragement of the illegal activity to warrant the imposition of
liability upon the international. See Riverton Coal Co. v. UMWA, 453 F.2d 1035, 1042 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 915 (1972).
58. 551 F.2d at 711.
59. 598 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1979).
60. Id. at 367.
61. See also Bituminous Coal Operators Ass'n, Inc. v. UMWA, 585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir.
1978); Republic Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 570 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1978); United States Steel
Corp. v. UMWA, 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1976).
62. 520 F.2d at 956.
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the unauthorized strikes.63 The court recognized that its position
was at variance with the Haislip holding, and vainly attempted to
distinguish the latter as authority by arguing that the absence of a
no-strike clause in the Haislip contract had relieved the UMWA of
an implied obligation to halt the illegal activities of its local
unions."
The Third Circuit further contended that the mass action theory
and the common law doctrine of agency, as expressed in sections
301 (b) and (e), warranted the imposition of liability upon the in-
ternational. 6 The court reasoned that the international had an im-
plied obligation to act, and its failure to do so functioned as ac-
ceptance of the illegal activity. Hence, the court determined that
the striking members were acting as agents of the international,
and that under the mass action theory or the principles of agency
law, the international was vicariously liable for the illegal activity
of its local unions.61
Carbon Fuel is a product of the judicial strife rooted in the Ea-
zor and Haislip decisions. The holdings of the Third and Fourth
Circuits reflected a polarization in the law which the Court was
bound to reconcile.
Carbon Fuel's argument obviously mirrored the principles devel-
oped in Eazor. In its interpretation of the "integrity" clause, Car-
bon Fuel's position was analogous to the treatment which the no-
strike clause received in Eazor. The Court's rejection of Carbon
Fuel's argument functioned as a realignment of the law and com-
ported with the limitations expressed in section 301.
Conversely, the holding in Carbon Fuel subsumes the principles
expressed in Haislip. The Court reiterated and affirmed the com-
mon law agency tests as the criteria for imposing liability upon an
international for the acts of its local unions. As the unanimous
Court indicates, the decision in Carbon Fuel merely manifests a
purpose to resolve a conflict which had persisted over the years.
The Court did not create an imbalance in the law to the exclusive
63. Id. at 963.
64. Id. at 960.
65. Id. at 963.
66. Id. at 964-65.
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benefit of either labor or management. The opinion simply pro-
vides an objective measure for determining the boundaries within
which an international union can be held liable for the acts of its
local unions.
STACY COLLIER FRANK
